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Introduction 
 
There are many reasons for insufficient progress in reducing hunger and 
undernutrition. One of these is a ‘lack of political will’ or political prioritisation.  
(Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 2012: 22) 
 
In recent years, the global hunger and nutrition community has increasingly come to view 
political commitment as an essential ingredient for pushing food and nutrition security higher 
up public policy agendas (Foresight Project 2011; te Lintelo et al. 2011, 2014b; FAO, IFAD 
and WFP 2013, 2014; Gillespie et al. 2013; International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) 2014). In response, commitment metrics and scorecard tools to assess levels of 
political commitment have proliferated. They enhance accountability of governments, donors, 
civil society and private sector organisations for actions addressing hunger and nutrition. 
International organisations and aid donors also use these tools to make decisions on funding 
and programmatic action. Examples of these metrics include the World Health Organization’s 
(WHO) nutrition landscape analyses (Engesveen et al. 2009); the HungerFree scorecard 
(ActionAid 2009, 2010); the Hunger Reduction Commitment Index (te Lintelo et al. 2011, 
2014b); the Nutrition Barometer (Save the Children and World Vision International 2012); the 
Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index (te Lintelo et al. 2013, 2014a); the Political 
Commitment Rapid Assessment Tool (Fox et al. 2014) and the Global Nutrition Report’s 
review of Nutrition 4 Growth Summit commitments (IFPRI 2014).  
 
These metrics have focused on operationalising the concept of political commitment to 
enable its measurement. Yet many inadvertently conflate commitment to address food 
security with commitment to tackle nutrition security; and commitment to fight hunger with 
commitment to combat undernutrition. This conflation is also common in the policy and 
academic literature (World Bank 2006) and in dominant narratives on nutrition in 
development (Nisbett et al. 2014). Because the concepts of food security and nutrition 
security are only partially overlapping, we hypothesise that government commitment to 
hunger reduction is empirically different from government commitment to reducing 
undernutrition. This study accordingly builds on research that has used secondary data to 
demonstrate that developing countries often have divergent strengths of commitment to 
hunger reduction and to nutrition (te Lintelo et al. 2013, 2014a). We review the literature to 
synthesise a set of nine political commitment indicators; construct a survey instrument; and 
collect primary data in five high burden countries (Bangladesh, Malawi, Nepal, Tanzania and 
Zambia) to ascertain whether government commitment to hunger is the same as commitment 
to nutrition. 
 
We present two key findings. Firstly, our evidence shows that hunger and nutrition 
commitment are not the same. Empirically, hunger reduction commitment exceeds nutrition 
commitment in Malawi, Bangladesh, Tanzania and Zambia, and the reverse is the case in 
Nepal. We thus affirm our hypothesis that government commitment to hunger reduction does 
not equate with commitment to nutrition. This matters because metrics that conflate hunger 
and undernutrition risk misinforming government and donor policy and maintain historically 
inadequate prioritisation of non-food aspects of malnutrition (Heaver 2005). This in turn 
imperils achieving key global or regional nutrition targets on stunting such as set out in the 
African Union Malabo Declaration 2014 (to achieve 10 per cent stunting levels by 2025), or 
by the World Health Assembly (a 40 per cent reduction of the global number of stunted 
children under five by 2025). We hence conclude that commitment metrics, which are gaining 
in popularity, must be sensitive to these differences in order to better guide public policy and 
programmatic action. 
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Our second main finding is that the research instrument developed for this study is 
sufficiently sensitive to record divergent performances on nine commitment indicators within 
each country. Accordingly, the instrument could have diagnostic value in assisting donors, 
civil society leaders and nutrition champions to assess in which areas commitment is in need 
of strengthening, and in which areas further strengthening may not be a priority. We discuss 
what kind of intervention strategy could improve nutrition commitment.  
 
Following this introduction, Section 1 provides a brief overview of the current status of hunger 
and undernutrition as global development problems and discusses some important 
conceptual differences that need to be reflected in political commitment metrics. This is 
followed in Section 2 by a synthesis of the literature to identify nine key political commitment 
indicators that inform the research instrument employed in this study. Section 3 presents the 
research methodology and the research instrument. Section 4 presents findings, followed by 
a discussion (Section 5) and conclusions (Section 6). 
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1 Hunger and undernutrition as a global 
problem  
 
Hunger and undernutrition are among the most persistent global development challenges. 
Global numbers of undernourished people remain very high despite some improvements 
since the 1990s (Black et al. 2013). In 2012–14, 805 million people (around one in eight 
people in the world) were estimated to be suffering from chronic hunger and regularly not 
getting enough food to conduct an active life (FAO et al. 2013). Just as there are multiple 
manifestations of hunger and undernutrition, so there are a number of different 
anthropometric measures, the most common of which are stunting (a measure of chronic 
undernutrition), wasting (acute undernutrition), and underweight (an amalgam of the two). 
Globally, one quarter of children aged under five are stunted (an estimated 162 million in 
2012); 15 per cent are underweight; and 8 per cent are wasted (United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF) 2014). At regional level these statistics can be even more alarming. Many 
countries in Africa still report high or very high child stunting prevalence rates, of 30 per cent 
or more. The worst affected countries are concentrated in Eastern Africa and the Sahel. A 
few countries in South Asia also report stunting rates of up to 50 per cent (FAO et al. 2013). 
The rate of stunting among children under five in South Asia is a staggering 32 per cent, 
while one in six (16 per cent) children in the region suffer from wasting (UNICEF 2014). In 
2012, nearly 70 per cent of the world’s wasted children lived in Asia and the condition 
exposes these children to a markedly increased risk of death. Undernutrition contributed to 
45 per cent, or 3.1 million deaths, of children under five globally in 2011 (Black et al. 2013), 
and is both a manifestation and an intergenerational driving mechanism of poverty (Nisbett  
et al. 2014). 
 
Notwithstanding the routine measurement of hunger and nutrition outcomes by governments 
and international organisations, the definitions, conceptual explication and accompanying 
measurement instruments for food security have rarely been static over the past three 
decades (FAO 2003; Foresight Project 2011; FAO et al. 2014: Annex 2). The partially 
overlapping nature of hunger, food insecurity and undernutrition concepts has impeded 
analytical clarity (Foresight Project 2011: 3–4). While nutrition has kept rising up the 
international development agenda over the past decade, thanks to major efforts by, among 
others, the Lancet Series (Bhutta et al. 2008), the Scaling Up Nutrition movement and the 
recent Global Nutrition Report (IFPRI 2014), policy and academic debates have long focused 
on agriculture and food. However, major international organisations such as the World Bank, 
UNICEF and FAO now explicitly use definitions and measurement indicators that distinguish 
between food and non-food aspects of nutrition, including care, hygiene and health. Thus, for 
instance, FAO defines food security as: ‘a situation that exists when all people, at all times, 
have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets 
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (FAO 2001), and has 
recently adopted a nutrition security definition that includes but ‘differs from food security in 
that it also considers the aspects of adequate caring practices, health and hygiene in addition 
to dietary adequacy’ (FAO et al. 2014: 50). This incorporation of food security as a subset of 
nutrition security facilitates an empirical assessment of whether political commitment to the 
reduction of food insecurity equates to the commitment to improve nutrition security. Or in 
common parlance: is commitment (for instance, at government level) to reduce hunger the 
same as commitment to improve nutrition?1 In order to answer this question, the next section 
explores the concept of political commitment to identify nine indicators that can ascertain 
commitment levels. 
                                                          
1 Here, we consider freedom from hunger (the experience of an empty stomach due to a deficit of food consumption) to equate 
with a narrow definition of food security. A broader definition such as employed by Foresight Project (2011) also expresses the 
latent risk of falling prey to hunger (having sufficient access to food today but at risk of loss in the future), as well as having 
sufficient access to food that can stave off hunger, but that is of a quality that is not good enough to provide sufficient vitamins 
and minerals for health. In turn, the concept of undernutrition considers, besides food, other deficits in care, water and sanitation 
and health services. Someone can also be food insecure but not suffer from undernutrition, either because food access is 
merely temporarily interrupted or is at risk only in the future (Foresight Project 2011). 
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2 Operationalising political commitment  
 
‘Political commitment’ is often considered synonymous with ‘political will’ 2 and has been part 
of mainstream development policy discourses for at least two decades. Debates in the 1990s 
and early 2000s considered political commitment ‘development’s latest holy grail’ (McCourt 
2003: 1015) and a key factor in explaining the outcomes of governance (e.g. Brinkerhoff 
2000) and macroeconomic reforms (e.g. Morrissey 1995; McCourt 2003). Responses to the 
2007–08 global food price crisis also highlighted the role of political commitment. The Irish 
Hunger Task Force (2008: 23) noted: ‘Addressing hunger... ultimately is a matter of political 
priorities’, and FAO (2012) identified political commitment as critical to achieving its strategic 
objectives of eradicating hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition.  
 
Political scientists have an ambivalent take on the concept of political commitment. ‘Standing 
at the crossroads of politics and policy’ (Post, Raile and Raile 2010: 654), political 
commitment is variously described as complicated and multidimensional (Goldberg et al. 
2012), a ‘classic black box’ (McCourt 2003: 1016), and the ‘slipperiest concept in the policy 
lexicon’ that is ‘never defined except by its absence’ (Hammergren 1998: 12). The concept is 
routinely used in a rhetorical, catch-all manner (Thomas and Grindle 1990: 1164), using post 
hoc circular logic (Brinkerhoff 2000) to explain both failure and success of public policy 
interventions. While this plasticity ensures commitment to remain an important part of the 
vocabulary of political leaders, various authors have attempted to define3 and unpack the 
concept to facilitate empirical analysis (e.g. Morrissey 1995; Brinkerhoff 2000; McCourt 2003; 
Shiffman 2007; Shiffman and Smith 2007; Post et al. 2010; Goldberg et al. 2012). These 
analyses have focused on two types of questions. Firstly, political economy approaches 
investigate the context within which political commitment emerges, seeking to explain why 
political commitment emerges or fails to emerge, often at national government level. 
(Examples of these relating to hunger and nutrition include Shiffman 2007; Mejía Acosta and 
Fanzo 2012; Pelletier et al. 2012; Gillespie et al. 2013; Mejía Acosta and Haddad 2014; 
Nisbett et al. 2014). Key explanatory factors for commitment identified by these studies 
include the structure of the polity and policy subsystems; ideas; the characteristics of the 
actors and their power; and the features of the policy issue at stake.4 While some cross-
country studies record common features, typically, in-depth political economy analyses focus 
on few cases within a country, as comparison across diverse contexts is highly complex. 
Theorisation of why and how contextual factors causally shape commitment has hence been 
limited (Post   et al. 2010; Brinkerhoff 2000).  
 
                                                          
2 We use these terms interchangeably. 
3 For instance, Post et al. (2010: 659) define political will as ‘the extent of committed support among key decision makers for a 
particular policy solution to a particular problem’. In contrast, McCourt (2003) considers common dictionary definitions, such as 
a ‘pledge or an undertaking’, sufficient to start conceptually unpacking commitment. 
4 These studies typically identify three major explanatory factors for the (lack of) emergence of political commitment. Firstly, the 
characteristics of the policy issue at stake. For instance, Shiffman and Smith note that ‘problems that cause substantial harm, as 
indicated by objective measures such as numbers of deaths, are more likely to attract resources than are those that do not’ 
(2007: 1372). In contrast, the invisibility of malnutrition for individuals, communities and governments leads them to discount 
human and economic costs of malnutrition and under-prioritise demand for nutrition services (Heaver 2005). Secondly, 
institutional characteristics of the polity and policy subsystems affect the creation of political commitment. These comprise for 
instance: the democratic or autocratic nature of the political regime; the roles of key institutions such as the presidency and 
parliament in policymaking; and the relations between scales of government involved in designing and delivering policies (e.g. 
Brinkerhoff 2000; Post et al. 2010). Also, multisectoral policy interventions require much learning within bureaucracies and more 
easily generate opposition to implementation than those that do not (Hyden and Karlstrom 1993). Thirdly, the configurations and 
characteristics of key actors within hunger and nutrition policy subsystems play an important role in driving commitment (e.g. 
Shiffman and Smith 2007). Characteristics include leadership, power, interests, values, beliefs and motivations. For instance, 
actors can consider interventions addressing hunger as the right thing to do, the beneficial thing to do, or the ‘commonsensical’ 
thing to do (cf. Yanguas 2013). Given that motivations differ, a certain level of consensus is needed in order for political 
commitment to become manifest (McCourt 2003; Hyden and Karlstrom 1993; Post et al. 2010). A ‘sufficient set’ of political 
leaders, policy elites and implementers thus need to agree (i) that a particular issue has reached problem status; (ii) on the 
nature of the problem; and (iii) that the problem requires government action (Post et al. 2010). Furthermore, they need to find 
effective ways of framing and expressing these preferences to gain the attention of the general public, and of political and 
bureaucratic leaders to generate traction in policy agenda-setting forums (cf. Chong and Druckman 2007). 
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This paper is however concerned with the second type of question: what does political 
commitment look like? How do we know it is there or not? Generally, analyses of political 
commitment underline revealed preferences, i.e. when intent is acted upon, because it is 
often impossible to divine – let alone measure – latent intent (Post et al. 2010; Morrissey 
1995; Brinkerhoff 2000). Political commitment should hence not be seen as separate from, or 
prior to, action on the ground. As such, commitment indicators need to be sensitive to what 
government decision-makers say, what they do and what they do not do in terms of material, 
legal and financial efforts (The Policy Project 2000). FAO (2012: 22) thus notes that 
government political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition would be shown by 
purposeful and decisive public action, through public policies and programmes, public 
spending and legislation. Various commitment scorecards and metrics have recently 
attempted assessing exactly this. WHO nutrition landscape analyses (e.g. Engesveen et al. 
2009) and Scaling Up Nutrition profiles (Scaling Up Nutrition 2013) summarise the presence 
of particular nutrition governance features within countries. Other tools actively compare 
countries, such as the Hunger Reduction Commitment Index (HRCI) (te Lintelo et al. 2011, 
2014b), and offshoots including a Nutrition Barometer scorecard (Save the Children and 
World Vision International 2012), the Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI)      
(te Lintelo et al. 2013, 2014a), and the Global Nutrition Report (IFPRI 2014). Typically, these 
metrics employ secondary data on policy, legal and financial commitment indicators to 
compare, score and rank countries.5 However, governments do not routinely collect and 
publish data on nine key commitment indicators identified in the literature: ‘explicitness’; 
‘irrevocability’; ‘voluntariness’; ‘publicness’; ‘mobilising support’; ‘continuity and capacity’; 
‘analytical rigour’; ‘credible incentives’; and ‘implementation’.  
 
For McCourt (2003), political commitment is strong to the extent that it is explicit, irrevocable, 
voluntary and public. ‘Publicness’ is about citizens’ physical and online access and the ability 
to scrutinise public policies. It is also about whether political and policy elites publicly state 
their support for, and set out what kind of priority they give to, a policy agenda (Johnson and 
Wasty 1993; McCourt 2003; Heaver 2005; Shiffman and Smith 2007; Post et al. 2010). 
Public statements of policy preferences need to be read in context. They can be acts of 
symbolic gesturing. Pelletier et al. (2012) find that Peruvian, Bolivian and Guatemalan 
political leaders publicly speak out on nutrition issues, but fail to translate this into effective 
action. Symbolic gesturing is however less likely when an issue attracts significant public 
attention; when citizens’ tolerance for manipulation is low; or if the cultural importance of 
saving face is high (Brinkerhoff 2000; Post et al. 2010). Also, when made in the face of 
strong opposition their public declarations suggest strength of conviction and commitment 
(Morrissey 1995). Conversely, the absence of a public declaration does not imply there is no 
commitment. Decision-makers weigh advantages and disadvantages prior to declaring policy 
preferences, keeping in mind both the administrative capacity to deliver the desired policies 
and the identities and power of potential opponents (Morrissey 1995; Hammergren 1998; 
Morrissey and Verschoor 2006). Part of this involves understanding which actors’ ‘agreement 
or indifference is necessary to change the status quo policy position’ (Tsebelis 2002).6  
 
‘Voluntary ownership’ of a policy agenda (McCourt 2003) constitutes a second indicator of 
political commitment. In the case of the nutrition agenda, Haddad (2013) notes that while 
international commitment is currently high, it is often unclear if this is truly reflected at the 
country level. Hence, are hunger and nutrition policies a donor agenda foisted on developing 
country governments, and/or do national policymakers and politicians themselves see these 
as important problems to address? The literature suggests that governments that experiment 
and innovate with new policy approaches, and whose spending on malnutrition is sensitive to 
electoral cycles and to emergencies and disasters, signal ‘voluntary ownership’ (Brinkerhoff 
                                                          
5 Some commitment metrics employ primary data, notably HRCI and HANCI, while the Political Commitment Rapid Assessment 
Tool (PCOM-RAT) awaits field-testing.  
6 Veto players may be located in both formal and informal political institutions, as shown by McCourt’s (2003) study of failed 
economic reforms in Swaziland, where traditional forms of authority overrode democratically elected leadership. 
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2000). It can also be assessed in terms of the locus of initiative for reforms: is a policy 
initiated and (co-)designed by the ministry or department that is espousing or implementing 
the change (Johnson and Wasty 1993; Brinkerhoff 2000)?  
 
A third indicator of commitment is the ‘explicitness’ with which policy initiatives are presented. 
Do governments set clear and realistically attainable policy goals, with specific targets? 
Where governments agree to put in place committees to review policy change, do they also 
clearly commit themselves to adopt their recommendations (McCourt 2003)? Are allocated 
budgets adequate for realistically addressing policy goals? National investment plans not 
only formalise financial commitments but also can help to give nutrition visibility and standing 
(Heaver 2005; Post et al. 2010). Political party manifestos provide critical guidance to the 
policy priorities of (future) ruling governments and opposition (see for example, Selbervik 
2006); their explicit incorporation of hunger and nutrition as developmental problems 
therefore signals commitment.  
 
A fourth indicator of commitment is whether government actions are ‘irrevocable’. Enshrining 
policy reforms in statutory law provides a barrier against reversal. Budget spending can be 
assessed for its adequacy in achieving policy goals. Clear budget lines and transparent 
financial mechanisms for earmarked hunger and nutrition funding are important 
accountability tools that can make spending promises harder to renege on. Discrepancies 
between budget requests and allocations, and between allocations and actual spending also 
signal levels of commitment (Heaver 2005).  
 
A further indicator of commitment is whether governments actively ‘mobilise support’ to build 
consensus, enhancing their ability to implement policy initiatives (Johnson and Wasty 1993; 
Brinkerhoff 2000). This may take the shape of subduing or compensating political opponents 
for losses incurred. Conversely, in cases where legislators or executives anticipate significant 
bureaucratic resistance at implementation but do nothing to constrain or placate key 
bureaucratic actors, they may be intentionally undermining a policy initiative (Post et al. 
2010). Heaver (2005) stresses how accountability to a wide range of actors is needed to 
mobilise support and develop greater commitment to nutrition. One important component of 
mobilising support is hence to adequately allow representation of divergent interests in 
hunger and nutrition policy development (Brinkerhoff 2000). Put otherwise, building 
commitment involves reducing political conflict (Morrissey 1995). 
 
Furthermore, commitment can be shown in terms of ‘analytical rigour’. That is, to what extent 
do governments undertake in-depth assessments of the problem at hand, and effectively 
generate and use data to devise technically suitable and politically feasible policy 
interventions (Brinkerhoff 2000; Shiffman 2007). Sustained support for a policy initiative also 
requires effective monitoring and evaluation systems to generate knowledge on policy 
delivery, adjustment and policy learning.  
 
Moreover, tackling enduring challenges such as hunger and undernutrition requires 
‘continuity and capacity’. Political will not only requires initiating, but also sustaining efforts 
and bearing associated costs in the face of opposition until results are achieved (Brinkerhoff 
2000; Heaver 2005). As such, governments that engage in ‘one-shot’ efforts at solving a 
policy problem, or that openly support a policy but subsequently fail to adequately fund it, are 
showing low commitment. A capable bureaucracy is essential for implementing policy 
initiatives, including sufficient human and financial resources – a common concern in 
nutrition policy (Pelletier et al. 2012; Nisbett et al. 2014). Moreover, a perceived lack of 
administrative, technical and strategic capacity to deliver policy can constrain policy elites to 
voice their commitment publicly (e.g. Brinkerhoff 2000; Morrissey 1995; Hyden and Karlstrom 
1993; Post et al. 2010). Strengthening and effectively using the financial and administrative 
capacities to deliver policy initiatives hence signals commitment. 
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‘Implementation’ of policy initiatives and reforms constitutes a critical area for assessing 
political commitment. The strength of implementation provides evidence of prior commitment 
(Morrissey 1995; McCourt 2003; Post et al. 2010). Feedback loops occur between the results 
of implementation and the (re)generation of political commitment to a policy initiative. 
Whereas strong implementation outcomes may strengthen resolve, weak outcomes may 
undermine existing commitment (Heaver 2005). Strong relations between spending and 
coverage of nutrition interventions signals high commitment, as is effective support for 
horizontal and vertical coordination mechanisms needed to deliver multisectoral nutrition 
interventions (Heaver 2005).  
 
A final commitment indicator concerns the extent to which government bureaucracies provide 
‘credible incentives’ to agencies and individual civil servants to deliver policy initiatives 
(Brinkerhoff 2000). Such incentives could relate to intrinsic motivations stemming from 
personal goals and values, and extrinsic motivations such as performance targets and 
milestones (Heaver 2005). Committed governments therefore would seek to institute credible 
incentive structures in agencies that design and deliver hunger and nutrition policy to reward 
good performance (e.g. through enhanced budgets, reputations, promotions) and conversely, 
to incur negative sanctions in case of failure. 
 
To sum up, we have identified nine indicators of political commitment: ‘explicitness’; 
‘irrevocability’; ‘voluntariness’; ‘publicness’; ‘mobilising support’; ‘continuity and capacity’; 
‘analytical rigour’; ‘credible incentives’; and ‘implementation’. In the next section we present a 
method for empirically assessing these indicators using primary data.  
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3 Methods  
 
The most popular research instrument for commitment metrics drawing on primary data is 
the expert perception survey. It has, for instance, been applied to assess political 
commitment regarding health (Goldberg et al. 2012), HIV/AIDS (USAID et al. 2003) and 
hunger and nutrition (te Lintelo et al. 2011, 2013, 2014a; Fox et al. 2014). This paper reports 
on findings from perception surveys conducted from July to October 2013 with 213 experts in 
five high burden and Scaling Up Nutrition campaign countries: Bangladesh, Malawi, Nepal, 
Tanzania and Zambia (see Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1  Hunger and nutrition data related to children under 5 years of 
age in the sample countries 
Country Wastinga Stuntinga Underweighta Source 
Bangladesh 16 41 36 NIPORT, Mitra and 
Associates, and ICF 
International (2013) 
Malawi 4 47 13 NSO and ICF Macro 
(2011) 
Nepal 11 41 29 MOHP, New ERA and 
ICF International Inc. 
(2012) 
Tanzania 5 42 16 NBS and ICF Macro 
(2011) 
Zambia 5 45 15 CSO et al. (2009) 
Note: a Percentage of children aged 0–59 months who are moderately or severely affected by this. 
  
The surveys were carried out by well instructed in-country consultants, and overseen by 
partner organisations working on hunger and nutrition issues. A careful selection of experts 
based in each country was made to ensure representation from government, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and/or civil society, the academic/research community 
and development partners. The consultants drew up lists of potential experts, with inputs 
from partner organisations and the authors. In order to obtain insider perspectives on political 
commitment, we endeavoured to include one-third of survey respondents from the 
government, and achieved this in all countries except Zambia. Substantial participation of 
government officials in the survey established external legitimacy and facilitated dialogue 
with government actors on research findings. Table 3.2 provides an overview of the sample 
of experts. 
Table 3.2  The distribution of the sample of experts  
  Bangladesh Malawi Nepal Tanzania Zambia Total 
Government 14 20 15 15 8 72 
NGO/civil society 10 18 9 12 14 63 
Academia/research 10 10 6 6 4 36 
Development partners 4 6 9 7 12 38 
Other 2 – – – 2 4 
Total 40 54 39 40 40 213 
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Given the multisectoral nature of hunger and undernutrition, we involved experts 
representing health, nutrition, water and sanitation, social protection, agriculture, local 
government and gender development sectors. Respondents participated on the basis of 
informed consent obtained beforehand. Responses were anonymised and aggregated 
across the sample in each country. 
 
Thirty-five survey questions sought to elicit experts’ subjective opinions about various 
aspects of their country’s government commitment to addressing hunger and nutrition. 
Because the concept of food security is a subset of nutrition security, before starting the 
survey, interviewers ascertained that respondents were clear about the conceptual 
differences.7 We then asked each survey question in Table 3.3 twice: once in relation to 
hunger and then again in relation to nutrition. 
Table 3.3  The questions representing nine political commitment 
indicators 
Explicitness 1. How well are the goals of improving (a) hunger and (b) nutrition outcomes 
expressed in development strategies/policies? (Q15) 
2. How well defined are (a) hunger and (b) nutrition outcomes in policies?Q17A) 
3. How well defined are (a) hunger and (b) nutrition outcomes in ruling political 
party/coalition manifestos? (Q17B) 
4. To what extent are government policy preferences for addressing (a) hunger 
and (b) nutrition reflected in budget allocations? (Q25A) 
5. In your opinion, how strong or weak would you, in general, characterise the 
national government’s absolute (in money terms) budget allocations on       
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition? (Q27A) 
Irrevocability 6. How well are budget lines related to (a) hunger and (b) nutrition developed in 
national budgets? (Q16) 
7. To what extent are government policy preferences for addressing (a) hunger 
and (b) nutrition reflected in its budget expenditures? (Q25B) 
8. How well has the government developed transparent financial mechanisms 
for earmarked (a) hunger and (b) nutrition funding? (Q26) 
9. In your opinion, how strong or weak would you, in general, characterise the 
national government’s absolute (in money terms) budget expenditures on   
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition? (Q27B) 
Voluntary 
ownership 
10. To what extent are (a) hunger and (b) nutrition policies initiated by the 
government agency responsible for executing these? a (Q4A) 
11. To what extent does the government experiment and innovate with new 
policy approaches in (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? (Q21) 
12. In your opinion, how sensitive are government budget expenditures on        
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition to electoral cycles? (Q28A) 
13. In your opinion, how sensitive are government budget expenditures on        
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition to emergencies/disasters? (Q28B) 
Publicness 14. What kind of a priority does the government give to (a) hunger and               
(b) nutrition?(Q2) 
15. How accessible is government policy on (a) hunger and (b) nutrition to public 
scrutiny?(Q22) 
16. How developed is presidential/prime ministerial leadership in the country on 
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition? (Q24) 
17. How convincing are public statements made by senior politicians at the 
national level in relation to (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? b(Q13) 
(Cont’d.) 
                                                          
7 Whereas the double burden of malnutrition (under and over-nutrition) is a growing concern in all of our countries, and political 
commitment against both aspects is of importance, this research focused on undernutrition and hunger. 
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Table 3.3  (Cont’d.) 
Mobilising 
support 
18. How well do agencies responsible for the design of (a) hunger and              
(b) nutrition policies build social/political support? (Q6A) 
19. How well do agencies responsible for the implementation of (a) hunger and 
(b) nutrition policies build social/political support? (Q6B) 
20. How well do policy/strategy decision-making bodies allow representation of 
divergent interests in area of (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? (Q8) 
21. How successful are agencies in gathering support to overcome resistance 
from threatened interests of stakeholders in (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? (Q9) 
Continuity 
and capacity 
22. To what extent does the government enhance administrative capacity to 
address (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? (Q35A) 
23. To what extent does the government enhance financial capacity to address 
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition? (Q35B) 
24. To what extent does the government utilise administrative capacity to 
address (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? (Q36A) 
25. To what extent does the government utilise financial capacity to address     
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition? (Q36B) 
Analytical 
rigour 
26. How developed are government systems that generate knowledge and 
evidence for (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? (Q19) 
27. How likely are government policies to be adjusted when strong evidence 
suggests a change in course for (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? (Q 20) 
Credible 
incentives 
28. For national government agency/agencies in charge of designing (a) hunger 
and (b) nutrition policy, is achievement or failure to achieve public policy 
objectives credibly rewarded or sanctioned? (Q32A) 
29. For national government agency/agencies in charge of implementing          
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition policy, is achievement or failure to achieve public 
policy objectives credibly rewarded or sanctioned? (Q32B) 
30. For individuals within the national government agencies in charge of 
designing (a) hunger and (b) undernutrition policy, is achievement or failure 
to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded or sanctioned? (Q33A) 
31. For individuals within the national government agencies in charge of 
implementing (a) hunger and (b) undernutrition policy, is achievement or 
failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded or sanctioned? 
Implementa- 
tion 
32. If the national government has appointed a coordinating body/bodies that 
promote(s) joined up thinking/action, how successful is/are the body/bodies in 
delivering a coordinated cross-agency approach to addressing (a) hunger 
and (b) nutrition? c (Q30) 
33. In your opinion, what is the strength of coordination efforts by national 
government with sub-national government efforts to improve (a) hunger and 
(b) nutrition outcomes? (Q31) 
34. How good is the implementation of public policies on (a) hunger and           
(b) nutrition? 
35. How sufficient are current government efforts towards fulfilling policy goals for 
those policies (you identified) which the national government considers most 
relevant to reduce (a) hunger and (b) undernutrition? a (Q5B)  
Notes: a A mean score was calculated based on opinions regarding up to five expert-identified flagship policies either addressing 
hunger or nutrition; b Data available for Zambia only; c All five countries have coordination bodies.  
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Each question uses a five-point Likert scale. An example of a scale used in HANCI is:        
(1) Very strongly, (2) Strongly, (3) So-so, (4) Weakly, and (5) Negligibly/not at all. Scales 
consistently used lower numeric values to denote higher commitment.8  We converted the 
experts’ Likert scale-based responses to percentage scales using the following 
transformation function: 
 
𝑥𝑖,𝑞,𝑐
′ = (
5 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑞,𝑐
4
) × 100 
where 𝑥𝑖,𝑞,𝑐 is the original Likert scale response by an expert, i, for a question, q, in a country, 
c, and 𝑥𝑖,𝑞,𝑐
′  is the corresponding percentage-transformed scale. The percentage scale 
allowed us to communicate findings to policy audiences in a more intuitive manner. The 
transformed scales were used to calculate mean score for each question, q, in a country, c. 
We also calculated mean scores at the indicator level. For both calculations, missing values 
were dropped. For example, if an indicator included two questions and one of the experts 
had only answered the first question, we drop his/her answer to that particular question but 
include his/her answer to the second question when calculating the indicator level mean 
score. Mean scores, both at the question level and at the indicator level, were estimated 
separately for hunger and for nutrition in each country. 
 
We use paired sample t-tests for each of the 35 questions within the five countries to test our 
hypothesis that estimated question level mean scores are not equal between hunger and 
nutrition. More specifically, the paired t-test measures whether the difference between the 
mean score for hunger and the mean score for nutrition is significantly different from zero. 
Some authors claim that the use of parametric analyses (such as the t-test) for statistical 
testing of ordinal data (such as those based on percentage-transformed Likert scales) leads 
to inaccuracies, because the data are not normally distributed (Jamieson 2004). However, 
others such as Norman (2010) counter-argue that the suitability of parametric tests is 
conditional only on the normality of sample means and not on the normality of the data. They 
point out that even in cases where the data are non-normal, the means thereof will have 
normal distributions. Accordingly we proceed in the next section to implement the analytic 
strategy noted above and test the hypothesis that hunger and nutrition commitment are the 
same using paired t-tests. However, we also analyse the sensitivity of our results to the 
parametric nature of the analysis. We do this by repeating the analysis using the Wilcoxon 
(1945) signed sum test; the non-parametric version of the paired sample t-test.  
 
The methodology employed was driven by our purpose to assess in-country political 
commitment. Expert perception surveys are well suited for this but do not explain underlying 
reasons for the data patterns detected. Moreover, we refrain from using the data for cross-
country comparisons. The problem is one of measurement equivalence: survey questions 
are not necessarily interpreted in the same manner across the geographical, social and 
cultural set of locations studied here, thus introducing systematic bias. Within a country, 
however, measurement equivalence is assured.  
                                                          
8 Three other five-point scales were used: (a) Very important, Important, So-so, Unimportant, and Very unimportant; (b) Very 
clearly, Clearly, Somewhat, Unclearly, and Very unclearly; and (c) Strongly developed, Developed, Somewhat, Poorly 
developed, and Non-existent. ‘Don’t know’ and ‘refrain to answer’ responses were re-coded as missing values before calculating 
the mean scores. 
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4 Findings  
 
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics of survey findings for each country. It presents mean 
scores calculated for two to five questions (see column ‘Qs’) for each of the nine political 
commitment indicators. For example, five questions are relevant for the ‘explicitness’ 
indicator. The count of tabulated valid responses, ‘Valid’, varies mainly because of the 
unequal number of questions for each indicator. We are more interested in the variability of 
valid responses due to missing values which is highlighted in column ‘Valid/N’ reporting valid 
responses as a proportion of N, the total possible responses for an indicator in a given 
country. The latter is the product of the number of questions in an indicator and the number 
of experts in a country. For example, N for ‘explicitness’ in Bangladesh is 200=40×5. Out of 
these 200 possible expert responses 188 were valid which yields ‘Valid/N’ value of 
0.94=188/200.  
Table 4.1  Summary statistics organised by country and indicator of 
political commitment 
  
Indicators of  
commitment 
Qs Hunger Nutrition 
Valid 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅
𝑵
 
Mean SD Med. 
Valid 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅
𝑵
 
Mean SD Med. 
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
s
h
 
Explicitness 5 188 0.94 68.4 22.7 75 186 0.93 55.6 23.4 50 
Irrevocability 4 153 0.96 55.6 23.5 50 152 0.95 46.5 22.5 50 
Voluntary ownership 4 129 0.81 66.5 23.8 75 134 0.84 57.1 23.3 50 
Publicness 4 117 0.73 70.1 23.0 75 117 0.73 61.5 24.5 75 
Mobilising support 4 157 0.98 60.8 22.7 50 157 0.98 54.6 21.9 50 
Continuity and capacity 4 153 0.96 56.4 21.4 50 154 0.96 46.6 22.0 50 
Analytical rigour 2 80 1.00 61.6 21.0 50 80 1.00 55.0 20.8 50 
Credible incentives 4 118 0.74 34.5 24.7 50 115 0.72 33.5 22.4 50 
Implementation 4 118 0.74 55.7 22.2 50 126 0.79 48.4 23.2 50 
M
a
la
w
i 
Explicitness 5 249 0.92 73.7 25.9 75 255 0.94 59.1 30.8 50 
Irrevocability 4 199 0.92 57.9 31.7 50 197 0.91 45.9 29.1 50 
Voluntary ownership 4 192 0.89 71.0 27.0 75 167 0.77 61.3 30.0 50 
Publicness 4 157 0.73 72.9 26.4 75 160 0.74 65.6 26.7 75 
Mobilising support 4 201 0.93 64.4 25.9 75 203 0.94 62.2 27.1 75 
Continuity and capacity 4 209 0.97 60.3 25.5 50 213 0.99 55.4 24.6 50 
Analytical rigour 2 107 0.99 59.1 28.4 75 102 0.94 59.3 28.3 63 
Credible incentives 4 167 0.77 42.1 33.3 50 171 0.79 39.8 32.5 50 
Implementation 4 185 0.86 60.2 24.4 75 169 0.78 58.7 25.7 50 
N
e
p
a
l 
Explicitness 5 174 0.89 50.6 22.6 50 179 0.92 52.7 24.2 50 
Irrevocability 4 138 0.88 44.4 21.1 50 148 0.95 46.3 22.8 50 
Voluntary ownership 4 133 0.85 53.0 24.5 50 147 0.94 56.6 24.9 50 
Publicness 4 112 0.72 55.4 24.5 50 113 0.72 59.1 25.7 50 
Mobilising support 4 152 0.97 54.1 22.7 50 152 0.97 57.6 21.2 50 
Continuity and capacity 4 152 0.97 45.4 18.1 50 152 0.97 47.4 18.0 50 
Analytical rigour 2 75 0.96 51.7 19.9 50 76 0.97 52.6 19.4 50 
Credible incentives 4 140 0.90 40.9 21.5 50 140 0.90 41.3 22.2 50 
Implementation 4 123 0.79 52.5 17.9 50 143 0.92 54.1 17.9 50 
(Cont’d.)  
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Table 4.1  (Cont’d.) 
  
Indicators of  
commitment 
Qs Hunger Nutrition 
Valid 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅
𝑵
 
Mean SD Med. 
Valid 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒅
𝑵
 
Mean SD Med 
T
a
n
z
a
n
ia
 
Explicitness 5 163 0.82 51.8 23.3 50 169 0.85 42.6 22.6 50 
Irrevocability 4 148 0.93 36.8 19.7 25 151 0.94 30.1 20.1 25 
Voluntary ownership 4 133 0.83 63.3 24.8 75 139 0.87 46.5 22.4 50 
Publicness 4 119 0.74 54.0 25.0 50 119 0.74 48.7 27.0 50 
Mobilising support 4 153 0.96 46.1 21.1 50 155 0.97 44.2 22.4 50 
Continuity and capacity 4 157 0.98 43.5 21.8 50 159 0.99 37.6 21.4 50 
Analytical rigour 2 78 0.98 48.1 22.7 50 79 0.99 39.6 19.9 25 
Credible incentives 4 152 0.95 20.4 20.4 25 153 0.96 19.9 19.5 25 
Implementation 4 138 0.86 51.2 21.4 50 150 0.94 45.3 23.3 50 
Z
a
m
b
ia
 
Explicitness 5 185 0.93 65.8 25.9 75 182 0.91 44.8 30.3 50 
Irrevocability 4 150 0.94 54.0 26.9 50 146 0.91 35.3 25.9 25 
Voluntary ownership 4 125 0.78 71.8 26.6 75 129 0.81 55.0 30.9 50 
Publicness 4 154 0.96 47.7 34.6 50 151 0.94 38.2 31.8 50 
Mobilising support 4 157 0.98 58.6 23.8 50 157 0.98 51.4 25.0 50 
Continuity and capacity 4 153 0.96 56.0 23.7 50 148 0.93 41.6 24.5 50 
Analytical rigour 2 78 0.98 60.9 25.7 50 77 0.96 52.3 24.7 50 
Credible incentives 4 127 0.79 13.8 22.3 0 131 0.82 13.1 24.8 0 
Implementation 4 101 0.63 57.7 23.4 50 103 0.64 45.0 25.3 50 
 
Some salient features of the data revealed in Table 4.1 highlight the following themes: 
  
1. Response rates are strong overall, though are not even for all commitment indicators. 
‘Valid/N’ for ‘Publicness’ is the weakest among all indicators in all countries except 
Zambia.  
2. The response rate for hunger and nutrition is similar for all indicators in all countries. 
It follows that experts who answered a hunger-related question were also highly likely 
to answer the corresponding question on nutrition, and vice versa.  
3. On 35 (out of 45) occasions the mean for the indicator of hunger commitment is 
higher than the corresponding mean for nutrition.  
4. Out of the remaining ten cases (where the hunger commitment mean is lower than 
the nutrition commitment mean), nine are in Nepal.  
5. On 11 occasions the median for hunger commitment is higher than the median for 
nutrition commitment and the reverse is true in none of the cases. 
6. Within each of the countries, the range of mean scores (in per cent) on commitment 
indicators vary substantially: in Zambia (13.1–71.8); Tanzania (19.9–63.3); Nepal 
(40.9–59.1); Malawi (39.8–73.7); and in Bangladesh (33.5–70.1). This suggests that 
within countries, commitment-building efforts could focus on indicators with lower 
range scores.  
 
We next take a more detailed look at the data. Figure 4.1 sets out mean scores on hunger 
and nutrition commitment for 35 questions asked organised by indicators within each 
country. All pairs of hunger-nutrition commitment averages are plotted in the figure with an 
arrow connecting the two averages. The arrows highlight whether there is a difference 
between the mean scores and also the direction of that difference. All right-pointing arrows 
indicate that hunger commitment obtained a higher mean score (stronger commitment) than 
nutrition commitment; the left-pointing ones indicate the reverse. Upward-pointing arrows 
indicate that the two means were identical.  
 
Figure 4.1 also summarises the results of the series of paired t-tests carried out to establish 
whether the observed differences are statistically significant. A black dot placed against a 
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country-question combination along ‘T’ in the horizontal axis indicates that mean scores for 
hunger/nutrition commitment are statistically different at the 1 per cent level of significance. 
Similarly, grey dots indicate significance at the 5 per cent level; white dots at the 10 per cent 
level. Missing dots signify (1) that hunger/nutrition mean scores are identical or (2) that they 
are different but the difference is not statistically significant. The dots against ‘W’ report the 
corresponding Wilcoxon signed sum test results and are colour coded similarly. 
 
The t statistic results in Figure 4.1 indicate that evidence from Bangladesh and Zambia 
provides the strongest support for the assertion that hunger and nutrition commitment are 
divergent phenomena. In Zambia, all commitment indicators have at least one expert 
question with a t statistic significant at the 5 per cent level. Out of 35 t-tests, 26 are significant 
(26/35) at the 5 per cent level.9 In Bangladesh 25/34 t-tests are significant and 8/9 
commitment indicators have at least one expert question with a t statistic significant at the    
5 per cent level. Moreover, in all of these 51 (26+25) cases, hunger commitment is stronger 
than nutrition commitment (as per mean scores). In the vast majority of these cases (19/34 
for Bangladesh and 23/35 for Zambia) the t statistics are significant at the 1 per cent level, 
which lends even stronger statistical support for these findings. 
 
Tanzania and Malawi have the next highest number of significant t statistics with 21/34 and 
15/34 statistics significant at the 5 per cent level respectively. Here again we find hunger 
commitment to be stronger than nutrition commitment. In Tanzania 7/9 commitment 
indicators have at least one expert question with a t statistic significant at the 5 per cent level, 
and in Malawi this is 6/9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Zambia has data for one additional question, question 17. 
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Figure 4.1  Empirical characterisation of political commitment to hunger and undernutrition  
Notes: Mean scores for 34 (and in case of Zambia, 35) questions are compared using arrows where the arrowheads point from nutrition scores to the corresponding hunger scores. The vertical axes 
show question numbers on the right-hand side and indicators on the left. The questions are spelt out in more detail in Table 3.3. In addition to comparing the means (using arrows) the figure also 
illustrates whether the estimated differences in mean scores are statistically significant. Significant t-test results are indicated by dots against the relevant question along ‘T’ in the horizontal axis. 
Similarly, significant Wilcoxon signed rank sum test results are indicated by dots along ‘W’. The dots are uniformly colour coded where white (○) indicates significance at 10 per cent level; grey (●) at 
5 per cent level; and black (●) at 1 per cent level. 
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Nepal has the lowest number of significant t statistics with 6/34 significant at the 5 per cent 
level. Interestingly, pair-wise comparison of means in these six cases finds nutrition 
commitment to be stronger than hunger commitment. Similar scoring patterns were found for 
19 other questions, however the differences were not statistically significant at the 5 per cent 
level. At the indicator level in Nepal, 4/9 commitment indicators have at least one expert 
question with a t statistic significant at the 5 per cent level.10  
 
The question-by-question comparison of hunger and nutrition commitment scores enables an 
assessment of how well questions empirically fit selected commitment indicators. For 
example, if four expert questions are relevant for a given indicator of commitment all four 
would be expected to score hunger above nutrition or vice versa. If not, the basis for 
selection of these questions to represent a given commitment indicator will have to be 
considered empirically weak. Our data in this respect show that in all instances where 
statistically significant differences in hunger and nutrition commitment were found, all 
questions in a given indicator in a given country rank hunger and nutrition commitment in the 
same order.  
 
Further, findings from Wilcoxon signed rank sum test results reported in Figure 4.1 confirm 
the t-test based results, nearly one to one. Out of 171 country-question combinations that 
were tested, only 14 yielded a Wilcoxon test result that diverged from the corresponding       
t-test result. Only in one case is this difference so strong that a t-test result rejecting the null 
hypothesis at least at the 10 per cent level was overturned when the test was done using the 
Wilcoxon method where the latter test failed to reject the null. It is clear that the core of the 
findings based on t-tests do not change if instead we use Wilcoxon tests. We therefore 
conclude that our results are not sensitive to whether parametric methods are used to arrive 
at those results. 
 
The results in Figure 4.1 may be summarised as follows:  
 
1. In each of the five countries studied empirical levels of government commitment to 
hunger reduction are shown to differ from commitment to nutrition.  
2. Hunger commitment is stronger than nutrition commitment in four of the countries: 
Bangladesh, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. 
3. In contrast, in Nepal nutrition commitment scores are statistically significantly higher 
than hunger commitment, at the 5 per cent level, however only in six out of 34 
questions. 
4. While findings for all political commitment indicators support the assertion that 
government commitment addressing hunger and nutrition is different, the ‘credible 
incentives’ indicator offers least support for this. These incentives tend to be 
systemic, and not unique to those parts of bureaucracies addressing hunger or 
nutrition. 
5. There is some empirical support for our allocation of questions under specific political 
commitment indicators. 
6. The results are robust and are not sensitive to the parametric tests used. 
                                                          
10 Whereas this study is not designed to explain why these results show for the countries we note that Nepal has seen 
remarkable improvements in stunting outcomes over the past decades and is one of a select group of low-income countries 
succeeding in achieving Millennium Development Goals on maternal mortality. 
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5 Discussion 
 
In this section we will situate these findings in the context of the existing literature in a bid to 
understand them better and to consider implications for donor organisations, civil society and 
governments which seek to enhance political commitment to reduce hunger and nutrition. 
 
The first key finding of our study is that empirically, hunger reduction commitment exceeds 
nutrition commitment in Malawi, Bangladesh, Tanzania and Zambia, while somewhat less 
strong evidence suggests the reverse is the case in Nepal. Failure to acknowledge what are 
often superior levels of commitment to hunger reduction within high burden countries may 
risk continuing historically inadequate prioritisation of non-food aspects of malnutrition 
(Heaver 2005), to imperil the achievement of key global or regional nutrition targets. For 
instance, the African Union Malabo Declaration 2014 seeks to achieve 10 per cent stunting 
levels by 2025 (African Union 2014), and the World Health Assembly targets a 40 per cent 
reduction of the global number of stunted children under five by 2025 (World Health 
Organization 2012).  
 
The second key finding from the study is that within each country, performance on the nine 
commitment indicators is quite uneven. The survey thus offers a diagnostic tool that could 
help donors, civil society leaders and nutrition champions to assess in which areas 
commitment is in need of strengthening, and in which areas further strengthening may not be 
a priority. Thus, in Bangladesh, ‘publicness’ is gaining strongest scores in the case of both 
nutrition and hunger, whereas for Zambia scores on this indicator lag behind other 
commitment indicators. Nevertheless, we also see some commonalities across countries. 
First, experts consistently allocated weakest commitment scores to ‘credible incentives’. 
Reforms towards more credible incentives in bureaucracies are not specific to nutrition and 
hunger; they are systemic and exemplify the impossibility of strengthening commitment 
overnight (Heaver 2005). Second, ‘irrevocability’ and ‘continuity and capacity’ emerge as 
other indicators on which scores are relatively poor in each country. In particular, expert 
scores highlight the need to anchor nutrition budget lines in national budgets; to substantially 
increase funding for nutrition in order to deliver government policy preferences; and the 
importance of developing more transparent financial mechanisms. These findings affirm 
concerns in the literature that highlight under-investment in care, hygiene and health aspects 
of nutrition (Heaver 2005); weak financial and administrative capacities to deliver nutrition 
interventions; unevenness in public information on national nutrition budget allocations and 
the poor tracking of domestic investments in nutrition. For instance, out of 51 Scaling Up 
Nutrition countries just three currently track domestic investments (Fracassi and Picanyol 
2014).  
 
In terms of the strongest commitment scores we witness greater variation across indicators 
in countries, as follows. In the case of nutrition commitment, ‘publicness’ received strongest 
scores in all countries except Zambia, and this indicator also obtains strongest scores in 
Nepal and Bangladesh for hunger commitment. This broadly affirms the finding from Pelletier 
et al. (2012) that while some governments do publicly speak out, committed action that 
delivers on nutrition is not as pronounced. For Tanzania and Zambia, ‘voluntary ownership’ 
obtains the strongest scores, and in Malawi the ‘explicitness’ indicator performs best for 
hunger commitment.  
 
Several factors may explain different hunger and nutrition commitment scores. In many 
countries, political elites commonly appreciate that containing extreme hunger is germane to 
political survival. As a former president of Nigeria noted: ‘A hungry person is an angry and 
dangerous person’ (Obasanjo 2005). Moreover, hunger commitment is foundational in some 
countries; Bangladesh’s independence occurred on the back of famine. Despite prominent 
recent statements by, for instance, Tanzania’s President Jakaya Kikwete and India’s former 
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Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declaring undernutrition as a ‘national disaster’ or a 
‘national shame’ respectively, historically non-food aspects of nutrition have not been as 
politicised as hunger. There is also a risk that symbolic politics thrive when reputational costs 
for unfulfilled public statements are low (Post et al. 2010) and the lack of popular demand for 
action on nutrition is indicative. One aspect of our survey (not reported above) explored who 
supports government action on hunger and undernutrition (see Figure 5.1). In all countries 
except Nepal, general publics are statistically significantly more supportive towards 
government efforts on hunger than nutrition. Furthermore, public support is often lagging 
behind donor support, raising questions about the sustainability of donor agendas.  
Figure 5.1  Stakeholder support for government action on hunger and 
nutrition 
 
Notes: The expert assessment of support by various stakeholders and the statistical significance of the level of support between 
the hunger and nutrition divide is documented here. Notation, the choice of statistical tests, and the colour codes used in 
presenting the test results are identical to those used in Figure 4.1. 
 
For communities, malnutrition is usually invisible, and neither they nor governments tend to 
recognise its human and economic costs (Heaver 2005; Haddad 2013). Malnourished 
people, unlike hungry people, hence are less inclined to demand government action, and 
less likely to vote or rebel for change. We thus find that nutrition budgets are much less 
sensitive to electoral cycles than hunger budgets (question 12 in Figure 4.1).  
 
Achieving greater nutrition commitment is also hindered by low levels of awareness or 
knowledge, institutional complexity and limited managerial capacity, and differing political or 
bureaucratic-political interests (Heaver 2005). Like the general public, decision-makers often 
have low awareness about the multiple causes, manifestations and consequences of 
malnutrition. Moreover, improving nutrition outcomes requires multisectoral action but this is 
often constrained by weak incentives for collaboration across sectors (Haddad 2013) and 
conflicting bureaucratic interests. Further, approaches to nutrition have also long been 
dominated by food- or disease-based models that emphasised technocratic solutions, 
neglecting political economy and policy process-related causes (Pelletier et al. 1995, 2012; 
Heaver 2005; Nisbett et al. 2014).  
 
Given these findings, what strategies could improve nutrition commitment? Hyden and 
Karlstrom (1993) suggest that interventions by donors, civil society and governments should 
consider two dimensions: ‘conflict’ and ‘ambiguity’. The former represents the extent of 
political opposition that interventions are likely to elicit, while the latter represents the learning 
required to implement these, in terms of complexity and range of organisations involved 
(Morrissey 1995). As compared to nutrition, anti-hunger interventions benefit from higher 
levels of consensus, lower complexity and a smaller range of organisations are likely to be 
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involved. Under such conditions, well-resourced technical solutions (Hyden and Karlstrom 
1993: 1,401) could address hunger, for instance by raising agricultural productivity and rural 
incomes. However, a different strategy may be needed for better nutrition outcomes. As long 
as nutrition remains under-politicised, efforts could focus on strengthening capacity (Hyden 
and Karlstrom 1993), before wide-ranging nutrition reforms are undertaken (Morrissey 1995: 
640). Our expert survey findings also highlight the need for capacity building. The capacity of 
implementing organisations may be built by appropriately motivating staff and encouraging 
clients to use and monitor nutrition services (Heaver 2005). An incremental approach, 
strategically using small-scale programmes rather than comprehensive reforms, can 
demonstrate improved nutrition outcomes, which in turn can generate commitment to do 
more and enhance capacity for attempting subsequent complex reforms (Heaver 2005; 
Morrissey 1995). Small aid donors or foundations lacking resources to finance direct 
intervention programmes at scale could aim to persuade governments to seek additional 
development assistance and allocate more of their own resources for nutrition (Heaver 
2005). Such an approach would also address long-term nutrition financing needs: aid funds 
for nutrition intervention programmes will always be a small proportion of what developing-
country governments contribute (Heaver 2005; IFPRI 2014). However, without increased 
understanding of the manifestations and consequences of malnutrition among political 
leaders, senior bureaucrats, civil society leaders, communities and parents, sustained 
demand for greater action on nutrition will remain muted.  
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6 Conclusion  
 
Academic and policy literatures as well as dominant narratives on nutrition in development 
have long had a tendency to conflate hunger with undernutrition, and food security with 
nutrition security (World Bank 2006; Nisbett et al. 2014). This suggests that commitment 
metrics, which have gained popularity in recent years, should be sensitive to these 
differences. This article accordingly aimed to empirically assess whether government 
commitment to hunger reduction is the same as commitment to addressing undernutrition. 
We synthesised the political commitment literature to identify nine commitment indicators, to 
build a survey instrument and test the hypothesis that governments are as equally committed 
to hunger reduction as to improving undernutrition. Structured surveys were conducted face-
to-face with 213 experts in five developing countries, each with high burdens of hunger and 
undernutrition: Bangladesh, Malawi, Nepal, Tanzania and Zambia.  
 
We find that in each case study country commitment to hunger reduction is not the same as 
commitment to nutrition, and paired t-tests show that these differences are frequently 
statistically significant. In Bangladesh, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia we find substantial 
evidence that hunger reduction commitment exceeds nutrition commitment. In Nepal, 
evidence is less pronounced but suggests that nutrition commitment surpasses hunger 
commitment. We thus affirm our hypothesis that government commitment to hunger 
reduction does not equate with commitment to nutrition and propose that commitment 
metrics are sensitive to these differences in order to better guide public policy and 
programmatic action.  
 
The expert perception survey tool we presented offers a diagnostic for governments, donors, 
civil society leaders and nutrition champions to assess in which areas commitment is in need 
of being strengthened, and in which areas further strengthening may not be a priority. Our 
work with civil society groups, members of parliament and governments in Tanzania and 
Zambia has highlighted that survey findings are highly relevant to policy dialogues and 
advocacy. This is because empirical data on the nine commitment indicators are rare, 
grounded in local realities and credible thanks to the balanced approach to respondent 
selection. Longitudinal application of this low-cost survey tool could thus help to track 
temporal progress in delivering committed hunger and nutrition action on the ground. The 
commitment metric developed in this paper is a first, imperfect effort. We anticipate 
improving the survey instrument to more precisely disentangle commitment to food aspects 
from commitment to the care, hygiene and health aspects of nutrition security, and to use 
vignette techniques to enable cross-country comparisons. 
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